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AGNES .BECKSTEAD, 
IN 'IlIB SUPREME OOURT 
OF TI-IE STATE OF lITAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
VS.· 
DELOS BECKSTEAD, · Case No. 18331 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The Plaintiff-Respondent initiated a headng on August 28, 
1981, for ~bdification of a Divorce Decree based upon substantial change 
in the Plaintiff-Respondent's circlilTIStances. 
DISPOSITibN' IN LOWER OOURT 
The hearing for t'bdification of Divorce Decree was held by 
the Honorable Larry R. Keller, District Court Judge, on January 25, 
1982. An Order llidifying the Decree of Divorce was signed and entered 
on the 18th day . ~f February, 1982. The Defendant-Appellant appeals 
fran the Order tvbdifying the. Decree of Divorce. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmation of the Trial 
Court's Order t-bdifying the Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMI<Nf OF FACTS 
The divorce was originally heard on October 2, 1979, by the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, DistrLct Judge o[ UK' 1hinl .J11<li.ci.;1l 
District ·Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
After a full and complete hearing on the trial of the issues 
of Jlvvn.:e, aud parllcularly Lhc Lssuc::; L·L'LtLL11g lo .-ii i11rn1y, Lltl' <~>llrl 
made several findings, the nnre pertinent of which VJere (1) that both 
the Plaintiff and Defendant ~re in need of $650. 00 each to rmintain 
themselves-, (2) that the Plaintiff was W1trained and LIDskilled and 
was able to maintain minimal employrrent, such as the position of a 
crossing guard, (3) the Defendant was physically fit and capable of 
flltlfft' n11ploy1111.•11I, (11) Pl.-ii111 i rr h.-id 110 n·I i 1"('1Jl1.•11I pn>i',Lllll ;111d II<> 
treans of future support beyond her present · incare of approximately 
$200.00 per rrnnth, (5) Defendant was entitled to retirerrent benefits 
in the sum of $517.00 per mnth. 
Based upon the above findings, the Court ordered the sale of 
the hare of the parties and awarded the Plaintiff sixty per cent (60%) 
of the net proceeds after the costs of sale and awarded the Defendant 
forty per cent (40%) of the net proceeds after the costs of sale. The 
-2-
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hem= was free and clear, except for one encumbrance of approximately 
$28,000.00 which was a first mortgage t\hich the parties had permitted 
to be placed upon their hare for a loan to one of their daughters 
whiCh was to be repaid by the daughter. The sixty per cent ( 60%) of 
the net proceeds from the sale of the home · of the par ties '"vilich was 
awarded to the Plaintiff included the obligation that w·ds owed by the 
daughter vhich was to be paid to Plaintiff-Respondent on a rronthly ba-
sis at approximately $308.00 per rronth. The Defendant was ordered to 
pay the SlD1l of $205.00 per rronth as alitrony. With the $233.00 per 
nnnth (for 9 nnnths of the year) as crossing guard employrrent, the 
$308.00 per oonth payrrent from the daughter's obligation, and the 
$205. 00 per nnnth aliunny to be paid by the Defendant, the Plaintiff 
was to receive approximately $650.00 incorre per ·rrnnth. 
The Defendant, on the other hand, had intorre of $517. 00 per 
rronth from his retirerrent, and the C,ourt deerrEd that he was capable of 
future employrr.ent and was able to invest the lump-sun award of forty 
per cent (40%) of the net sales proceeds (approximately $27 ,000.00) 
fran the sale of the h~ to have sufficient resources to obtain the 
· $650. 00 per rronth Yhich the C,ourt deerrEd he needed for his support. 
The Plaintiff never did receive the rronthly payrrents from 
h~r daughter apparently due to antagonism between the daughter and the 
Plaintif £-Respondent and the daughter eventually filed for bankruptcy 
and was discharged in bankruptcy vhereby the $28,000.00 obligation was 
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totally nullified and rendered unenforceable. The nnrtgage to the bank 
had been paid upon the sale of the hoTTE and the unsecured debt from 
the daughter to the Plaintiff-Respondent was to he paid at approxi-
mately $308.00 per m:mth. Furtherrrore, the Defendant-Appellant had 
assured the Plaintiff-Respondent and the court that he would assure 
Plaintiff-Respondent that the daughter ~uld provide ·other property as 
collateral for the obligation, but the Defendant-Appellant failed or 
refused to perform. Because of the bankruptcy, Plaintiff-Respondent 
lost the benefit of the $308.00 per rronth leaving the Plaintiff-
Respondent with her incoITE as a crossing guard of $233. 00 per rronth 
for nine mmths of the year (or $174.00 per IIDnth for 12 months) and 
the $205. 00 per rrnnth for alimmy mich is a total of $3 79. 00 per 
m::mth for 12 months. 
·1he Plaintiff-Respondent, therefore, initiated an action for 
Modificat.ion of the Divorce Decree to increase the alimony payrTEnts to 
$400. 00 per IIDnth to provide her with the income necessary to sustain 
her minimum standard of living. 
ARGUMENT 
The Defendant-Appellant sets forth four ( 4) separate argu-
~nts in his brief on appeal. The Plaintiff-Respondent will respond 
to Points I and II join~ly and Points III and IV jointly. 
-4-
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POINT I 
THE PIAINTIFF-RESPONDENT PROPERLY SOUGHT A t-ODIFI-
CATION OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE AND STATrn SUFFI-
CIENT GROUNDS TO PERMIT M)OIFICATION. 
It is difficult to follow ~fendant-Appellant's argurrent in 
Point I, but the gist of. his arguirent appears to be that because 
Plaintiff-Respondent never received any paynent from her daughter, a 
nodification could not be made of that portion of the mv·drd of the ori-
ginal Decree of Divorce. The Defendant-Appellant does not cite any 
case law to support his position. 
If Defendant-Appellant's position is correct, rrnst def en-
dants in a divorce action who are ordered to pay alirnony or support 
need only to.refuse to rrake payirents as ordered by the court to defeat 
any subs.equent attempt to rrodify the alilrony or support provisions of 
the divorce decree. To carry the absurdity further, a plaintiff vho 
has custody of minor children need only to refuse the opposing spouse 
visitation privileges to defeat any attempt at.rmdific:=ttion of the de-
cree of divorce for -specific visitation ,privileges.· 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
Plaintiff-Respondent attempted to or in fact did file any docurrents to 
set aside the Decree of Divorce under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and the only provision in the Divorce Decree sought 
to be rrodified hy the Plaintiff-Respondent was the provision for ali-
rrony. 
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The Defendant-Appellant claims that Plaintiff-Respondent did 
not state sufficient grounds for M:>dification of the Decree of Divorce. 
Assuming that the Defendant-Appellant is referring to the allegations 
in Plaint if £-Respondent 's Petition for llidification and not to the 
Court's authority to rrodify a Decree of Divorce, this Court need only 
review Plaintiff-Respondent's Verified Petition for t·bdification of 
Decree vhich clearly states that of the $650. 00 per ITDnth income vhich 
was intended as part of Plaintiff-Respondent's award, Plaintiff-
Respondent lost $308.00 as a result of the bankruptcy filed by 
Plaintiff-Respondent's daughter, Diana Beckstead. Certainly, a de-
c:r:ease in rrnnthly support of $308.00 out of a totally intended $650.00 
is sufficient grounds to seek a nndification. The loss incurred by 
the Plaintiff-Respondent of $308. 00 in nnnthly income was due to no 
fault of the Plaintiff-Respondent and totally out of her control and 
totally binding upon her since the Bankruptcy Court discharged the ob-
ligation, pursuant to the United States Bankruptcy law. 
POINf II 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE ORDER M)DIFY-
ING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND THERE WAS NO ABUSE 
OF THE ffiURT 'S DISCRETION IN ~UDIFYING THE DECREl<:. 
Clearly, the evidence before the C_,ourt in the rbiification 
Hearing was sufficient to justify the nndification of the ori3;i.nal De- · 
cree of Divorce. The evidence indicated that the Defendant-Appellant 
-6-
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was still receiving his retirerrent benefits, and that the Defendant-
Appellant had approximately $H,OOO.OO invested in imney market certi-
ficates at between 10% to 14% interest per annum. TI1e evidence further 
showed that the Defendant-Appellant was able to maintain employment if 
he desired to do so but hesitated to accept perrranent employrrent be-
cause his retiren~nt benefits would be reduced after a certain minimum 
incc:xre was ea~ned by the Defendant-Appellant. It did not re.fleet that 
the O=fendant-Appellant could no longer retain employrrent. 
The finding by the Trial Court in the original <livorce hear-
ing that.the Defendant-Appellant was capable of future employment was 
proved by the Defendant-Appellant's own testiroony in the tbdification 
Hearing.· 
'l.he basis for a rrodification of a Divorce Decree is a change 
in ~laintiff's or Defendant's circumstances or a change in both of the 
parties' circumstances :vhich \\Uuld warrant a rrndification of the de-
cree, and a Trial Court has wide discretion in making such nndifica-
tion. In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, (1974) the Suprerre Court 
of Utah stated: 
"Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1969, pro-
vides: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court nay 
make such orders in relation to the children, property and 
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children, as 
may be equitable. The court shal 1 have continuing juris-
diction to rmke such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to the support and m:tintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and rnintenance, 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary. 
-7-
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"(1-4) In accordance with this statute, this 
court has held that a proceeding to rrodify a divorce decree 
is equitable and the same authority is conferred upon the 
trial court to make subsequent changes as respect to support 
and ITTlintenance as it could have dealt with them originally .1 
Under Article VIII, Section 9, C.Onstitution of Utah, it is 
both the duty and prerogative of this court in an equitable 
action to review the law and the facts and make its own find-
ings and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 
Ho~ver, in a divorce action, the trial court has consider-
able latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and pro-
perty interest, and its actions are indulged with a presump-
tion of validity. The burden is upon appellant to prove 
that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings 
as rmde; or there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; 
or a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion.2 " 
It is clear fran the precedents that the Trial Court has 
wide discretionary authority in rrodifying the divorce decree when the 
court finds a substantial chanp;e in circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence 
clearly supports the Trial Court's Order 11xlifying the Divorce Decree 
and the Trial Court's judrrent should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of June, 1982. 
-8-
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNE'IH M. HISATAKE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
1825 South Seventh East 
SAlt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 486-3541 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the fore-
going Respondent's Brief, postage prepaid, to: 
Don Blackham, Esq. 
BIACKIW1 AND BOLEY 
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'Ibis day of Jlllle, 1982. 
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